




MEMORANDUM FOR: *Ad Hoc Sec. Group*  
*file*

*DATA for use by DCL*  
*in preparation for his*  
*opening comments to Select*  
*Senate Committee*

Prepared by   
*and* , *SEC*  
*com*

 (DATE)

25X1A

25X1A

FORM NO. 101  
1 AUG 54 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

I would like to speak briefly of the need to preserve secrecy concerning certain matters which will be disclosed before this Committee--particularly information, which, if compromised, could directly effect our continuing ability to produce vital intelligence. We certainly are not so insensitive as to argue that our secrets are so deep and pervasive that we in the intelligence community are beyond scrutiny and accountability. The proceedings of this Committee must be such as to ensure Congress and the public that the activities of the intelligence community are within the scope of statutory authority and are subject to the appropriate degree of oversight. There is an obvious conflict, however, between the right of citizens in a democracy to know what their government is doing in their name (and with their money) and the essential need of any intelligence organization to protect its sources and methods, in order that they will continue to be productive.

Whereas the objectivity of governmental security procedures is diverse, their application to the protection of intelligence sources and methods is specific--to ensure the continued flow of intelligence. All intelligence

sources and methods possess at least one thing in common-- they are all vulnerable. Appropriate counteraction can always be taken to either deny us the source, or to markedly reduce its productivity. There are no degrees involved in intelligence security--either the source is protected and continues to supply needed information, or the source is compromised and we are denied the information.

I firmly believe we can be forthcoming with this Committee. In so doing, however, I must request that you share a measure of responsibility for the protection of sources and methods. This is no more than is asked of each and every recipient of classified intelligence. In this regard, there are certain minimum requirements, many of which would probably apply to much information related to internal security, although this is the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

We must protect the identities of U. S. nationals and foreign officials who either work for us or with us abroad. To do otherwise could

--threaten the safety and welfare of those who may be providing us intelligence at a substantial personal risk.

--permit their identification and consequent termination.

--result in substantial diplomatic and political difficulties in our foreign relations.

We must protect the identities of other individuals who from time to time provide us with intelligence. To do otherwise would raise question as to our ability to retain the secrecy on which their collaboration with us rests.

We must protect the advanced and sophisticated technology that brings us such high-quality information today. To do otherwise, would invite targeted governments to take counter-measures designed to thwart our collection efforts.

We must protect the complex communication channels and processing procedures associated with intelligence. To do otherwise would be to open a crack through which the opposition could readily view the entire intelligence operation.

Failure to meet any of these requirements, could prove very damaging and I trust the committee will institute security measures comparable to those practiced in the Executive Branch. These include: 1) maintaining strict accountability records on all classified materials furnished to the Committee; 2) ensuring that all staff members are appropriately screened as to their security trustworthiness; 3) maintaining all

classified materials in prescribed safekeeping equipment to prevent access on the part of unauthorized individuals, 4) ensuring that premises wherein all classified discussions take place are free of clandestine listening devices, and 5) seeking the advice and guidance of originators of classified documents before any of the contents are released publicly, to ensure that the information released does not compromise sources and methods.

I would like to add one additional proposal which will afford us considerable assurances. I would like permission of the committee to remove the identity of individuals and codenames ascribed to intelligence activities from those documents provided for the committees use and retention.

In asking you to share responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods, I, of course, stand ready to provide you with any technical assistance you may require.